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INTRODUCTION 
n increase in cross-border securities transactions has resulted 
in a heightened need for international cooperation. Many 
issues, however, may arise when multiple securities regulators 
simultaneously try to enforce their securities regulations. This Article 
focuses on one of these issues, regulatory overlaps and gaps, and 
proposes how securities regulators change the current cooperation 
framework. 
Assume that an investor residing in one country, where securities 
regulator X oversees the market, conducts market manipulation in 
another country, where securities regulator Y oversees the market. 
Under the current primary cooperation framework among securities 
regulators, the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) 
(drafted by the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO)), Y will likely ask for the cooperation of X to obtain material 
A 
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information regarding the investor. Nowadays, this type of cooperation 
occurs frequently. What happens if, however, X also wants to enforce 
its securities regulation against the investor? 
Depending on the nature of the case, there might be a regulatory gap 
or overlap. For example, X may not be willing to share information with 
Y, and Y may not be able to find any violations committed by the 
investor. On the other hand, if X can use only criminal proceedings to 
regulate the conduct, X may fail to prosecute the investor. This is due 
to various reasons such as more demanding procedures generally 
required in criminal investigations. This means that there is a regulatory 
gap where no authority may be able to exercise effective regulation. 
Alternatively, Y might exercise jurisdiction based on the place 
of conduct, yet X might exercise jurisdiction based on the effects of 
the investor’s conduct overseas. When there is a regulatory overlap 
and parallel investigations by X and Y, multiple issues can occur. For 
example, enforcement by one regulator might disturb the other 
regulator’s investigation because of an inadvertent disclosure of the 
investigation, double jeopardy concerns, or an infringement of a 
constitutional protection.1 If so, should there be an international rule 
regarding the priority between X and Y? 
The following three aspects illustrate the importance of the issues 
raised above: (1) shortcomings in the current cooperation framework, 
(2) actual cases where regulators with strong interests were restrained
due to international double jeopardy concerns, and (3) adoption in some
countries’ domestic law of a “broader” version of an international
double jeopardy principle that would treat some foreign administrative
penalties as the equivalent of criminal penalties.
Many scholars have analyzed relevant issues, including regulatory 
gaps or overlaps in a broader context;2 the enhanced authority in, and 
increased use of, administrative proceedings and their constitutionality 
1 As I discuss in detail in Parts III and IV, when a regulator gives premature notice of 
investigation to wrongdoers inadvertently, wrongdoers may hide material evidence or 
conspire with relevant parties. In a jurisdiction where the international double jeopardy 
principle is recognized, a securities regulator in the jurisdiction will have to discontinue 
criminal investigation if securities regulators in another jurisdiction impose criminal 
penalties. Use of evidence by a regulator in criminal enforcement may infringe upon 
constitutional protection such as the privilege against self-incrimination if the evidence was 
obtained by another regulator in administrative investigation. 
2 See, e.g., Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory 
Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 209 (2002). 
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in the United States;3 the constitutionality of parallel administrative and 
criminal proceedings and information exchange between U.S. 
regulators;4 and whether the double jeopardy principle should be 
recognized internationally.5 They have, however, mostly focused on 
domestic issues and largely ignored issues that have occurred in 
international cooperation in securities regulation. 
This Article, therefore, seeks to fill this gap by expanding the scope 
of analysis to the international setting and making specific revisions to 
the MMoU to contribute to more efficient and effective securities 
enforcement on a global level. Part I describes the current regulatory 
framework to combat cross-border market misconduct. Parts II and III 
focus on regulatory gaps and overlaps, respectively, by explaining 
why they occur before providing solutions. Part IV discusses recent 
issues occurring in the intersection of administrative and criminal 
enforcement against market misconduct in the international setting. 
This Article concludes by proposing how regulators all over the world 
can complement each other through the new provision of the MMoU. 
I 
FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 
AND ENFORCEMENT 
This Part defines market misconduct and describes representative 
enforcement tools including administrative, civil, and criminal 
proceedings. This Part also explains that securities regulators have 
made efforts to cooperate through an international framework to 
enhance their abilities to investigate and prosecute cross-border market 
misconduct. 
A. Market Misconduct
In this Article, “market misconduct” refers to insider trading 
and market manipulation. “Insider trading” is defined as “buying or 
selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of 
trust and confidence, on the basis of material, nonpublic information 
3 See, e.g., David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155 
(2016). 
4 See, e.g., Shiv Narayan Persaud, Parallel Investigations Between Administrative and 
Law Enforcement Agencies: A Question of Civil Liberties, 39 DAYTON L. REV. 77 (2013). 
5 See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: 
A Jurisdictional Theory, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 769 (2009). 
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about the security,”6 whereas “market manipulation” is defined as 
“intentional conduct designed to deceive investors by controlling or 
artificially affecting the market for a security [through, for example] 
trades to create a false or deceptive picture of the demand for a 
security.”7 
There is, however, no single anti-fraud provision to regulate market 
misconduct globally, and each regulator has its own regulatory regime.8 
For example, in the United States, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC or the Commission) and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) have used one of the anti-fraud provisions, Rule 10b-5 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,9 to regulate securities fraud including 
market misconduct.10 
If securities markets are efficient, they serve as a crucial mechanism 
in determining an appropriate price for securities, transferring 
and diversifying various risks among market participants.11 The 
determination of an appropriate price, transfer, and diversification of 
various market risks achieve economic growth and financial stability.12 
The more efficient securities markets are, the more likely these goals 
will be achieved.13 Regulatory gaps and overlaps in combating cross-
border market misconduct cases, however, impede the efficiency of 
securities markets.14 
6 Fast Answers, Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/insider.htm (last modified May 16, 2018). 
7 Fast Answers, Manipulation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/tmanipul.htm (last modified Mar. 28, 2008). 
8 Junsun Park, Global Expansion of National Securities Laws: Extraterritoriality and 
Jurisdictional Conflicts, 12 U.N.H. L. REV. 69, 69 (2014). 
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). 
10 Rule 10b-5 has been characterized as “the most far-reaching” catch-all provision. 
Genevieve Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud and the Extraterritorial Application of 
U.S. Securities Laws: Challenges and Opportunities, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 139, 142 
(2011). 
11 Ana Carvajal & Jennifer Elliott, Strengths and Weaknesses of Securities Market 
Regulation: A Global Analysis 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/07/259, 
2007).  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 See Ana Carvajal & Jennifer Elliot, The Challenge of Enforcement in Securities 
Markets: Mission Impossible? (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/09/168, 2009) 
(observing that enforcement seems to be the most challenging element for regulators 
throughout the world).  
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B. Enforcement Tools
Some securities regulators can use multiple enforcement tools to 
regulate market misconduct while other regulators may solely rely on 
criminal enforcement.15 For example, the SEC has extensive and 
preeminent authority under the federal securities laws to pursue three 
types of enforcement actions: administrative, civil, and criminal.16 
First, the SEC may seek a variety of sanctions through 
administrative proceedings, which are presided over by an 
administrative law judge, who is independent of the Commission.17 The 
administrative law judge conducts a hearing, considers the evidence, 
and issues an initial decision including recommended sanctions such as 
cease-and-desist orders, suspension or revocation of registrations, civil 
monetary penalties, and disgorgement.18  
Second, the Commission can file a civil complaint with a federal 
district court, seeking various sanctions including an injunction to 
prohibit any further violations, civil monetary penalties, disgorgement, 
and bar or suspension of a corporate officer or director.19 The 
Commission may bring a case either in federal court or before an 
administrative law judge, or both, depending on various factors.20 
Third, the SEC has both a formal and informal process for referring 
criminal cases to the DOJ.21 Under the formal process, SEC staff 
members prepare a criminal reference report for the Commission, 
which decides whether to refer the case to the DOJ.22 Under the 
informal process, which is more often used in practice, a staff member 
discusses a nonpublic investigation with DOJ prosecutors. The 
15 See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 909 
(2002) (observing that many regulators rely solely on criminal enforcement); see also 
About the Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec. 
gov/enforce/Article/enforce-about.html (last modified Aug. 2, 2007) (describing SEC’s 
administrative, civil, and criminal enforcement tools). 
16 About the Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec. 
gov/enforce/Article/enforce-about.html (last modified Aug. 2, 2007); KIRKPATRICK & 
LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP, THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 3 
(Michael J. Missal & Richard M. Phillips eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
17 How Investigations Work, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/ 
News/Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012 (last modified Jan. 27, 2017). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP, THE SECURITIES 
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 394 (Michael J. Missal & Richard M. Phillips eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
22 Id. 
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Enforcement Division of the SEC also shares investigative files with 
the DOJ.23 
C. Current Cooperative Framework: IOSCO and MMoU
To enhance their abilities to investigate and prosecute cross-border 
market misconduct, securities regulators have made efforts to 
cooperate.24 Because there is no single regulatory authority to govern 
all securities markets globally, each regulator has tried to apply its 
domestic securities regulation extraterritorially to regulate cross-border 
market misconduct.25 However, because investigatory authority is 
generally limited within a territory, regulators need assistance from 
foreign regulators, such as collecting documents from a foreign 
resident, to enforce their domestic laws.26 Currently, the DOJ and the 
SEC can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the effects or 
conduct test under the Dodd-Frank Act,27 but this exercise does not 
guarantee that they can gather evidence and find the violation.28 
In today’s securities markets, cross-border transactions have become 
very common and complex. Therefore, activities in one jurisdiction 
frequently affect securities markets and regulations in other 
jurisdictions.29 Those who engage in cross-border market misconduct 
can organize entities globally, employ overseas transactions, transfer 
funds across borders, invest in securities in foreign markets, or work 
with foreign parties, thereby intentionally structuring the schemes 
through which they seek to avoid regulatory detection.30 Under such 
circumstances, international cooperation between securities regulators 
is crucial. 
23 Id. 
24 Michael D. Mann & William P. Barry, Developments in the Internationalization of 
Securities Enforcement, 9 INT’L LAW. 667, 667 (2005) (observing that regulators have 
responded to cross-border cases by formalizing cooperation with each other). 
25 Park, supra note 8, at 234. 
26 Id; see also J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES 
LAW § 11:53 (2012) (describing obstacles to SEC in cross-border securities enforcement). 
27 See infra Section III.A.1.b (describing the relevant provision of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
28 Park, supra note 8, at 243. 
29 See generally Mann & Barry, supra note 24. 
30 See Junsun Park, Enforcement of Securities Law in the Global Marketplace: Cross-
Border Cooperation in the Prosecution of Transnational Hedge Fund Fraud, 39 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 231, 241, 243 (2014) (explaining how hedge funds structure cross-border deals to 
avoid enforcement). 
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In 1983, the International Organization of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO) was founded as “the international body that brings together 
the world’s securities regulators” and “the global standard setter for 
the securities sector.”31 In response to the increase of cross-border 
securities transactions, securities regulators around the world started 
cooperating first by entering into bilateral treaties and memoranda of 
understanding (MoUs).32 Then, in 2002, the IOSCO created the 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) to set a global 
cooperation framework among its over one hundred members to 
consult, cooperate, and exchange information with each other.33 The 
MMoU has become a significant cooperation framework among 
securities regulators.34 
The success of international cooperation agreements depends on two 
factors: (1) the degree to which they are used and improved,35 and 
(2) the degree to which domestic laws and courts support them.36 In
order to be successful, countries like the United States have established
provisions authorizing their securities regulators to provide cross-
border assistance.37 Those provisions allow domestic securities
regulators to obtain evidence located abroad and overcome obstacles in
enforcing laws against transnational securities fraud.
II 
REGULATORY GAP 
When a country fails to enforce securities regulations, a regulatory 
gap forms.38 Regulatory gaps form for three main reasons. First, a 
31 About IOSCO, INT’L ORG. SEC. COMM’NS, https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection 
=about_iosco (last visited Jan. 29, 2018). 
32 See MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW: A CONTEMPORARY AND 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 203 (1999) (describing MoUs generally).  
33 Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and 
Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, INT’L ORG. SEC. COMM’NS, https://www. 
iosco.org/about/?subsection=mmou (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter MMoU]. 
34 See Park, supra note 30, at 250–51 (observing that many securities regulators have 
employed the MMoU mechanisms). 
35 See Mann & Barry, supra note 24, at 696 (claiming that agreements are only 
statements of intent, so the practice of using them needs to be developed).  
36 See id. at 687 (claiming that the ability to implement multilateral understanding relies 
on whether regulators have the authority under the domestic laws).  
37 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (2015) (authorizing the SEC 
to provide assistance to foreign authorities). 
38 Joel Trachtman, Externalities and Extraterritoriality: The Law and Economics 
of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 642, 643 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan D. 
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securities regulator may have no authority to prosecute cross-border 
market misconduct. This occurs when there is no basis for a securities 
regulator to apply its domestic securities regulation extraterritorially to 
conduct occurring overseas or to a person residing overseas.39 Second, 
a securities regulator may lack authority due to domestic reasons or 
may have to rely solely on criminal enforcement.40 Third, even when a 
securities regulator can apply its domestic securities regulation 
extraterritorially, it may not achieve effective enforcement because 
of shortcomings in international cooperation.41 These three main 
situations create opportunities for fraudsters to evade regulations, 
which disrupts market integrity.42 
A. Sources of Regulatory Gap
This Part describes how cross-border regulatory gaps occur due to 
three main reasons: territoriality, lack of domestic authorities, and 
shortcomings in international cooperation. 
1. Territoriality
If a securities regulator cannot apply its securities regulation
extraterritorially, this action would likely lead to a regulatory gap.43 
This territoriality issue had traditionally caused regulatory gaps in 
securities enforcement.44 However, in current securities regulation, 
territoriality may not be a huge obstacle for securities regulators. 
As discussed in Section III.A.1 below, the extraterritorial application 
is generally accepted,45 and it could cause regulatory overlaps rather 
than regulatory gaps. However, significant issues exist where a 
securities regulator can apply laws extraterritorially but cannot exercise 
effective enforcement because of a lack of authority or shortcomings in 
international cooperation.  
Sykes eds., 1997). Trachtman used the term “regulatory underlaps” to show regulatory gaps 
that would allow “possible regulatory arbitrage, avoidance or evasion.”  
39 See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 55–56, 61 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 74, 76 and accompanying text. 
43 See Guzman, supra note 15 (claiming that where jurisdictions could not or did not 
apply their laws extraterritorially, there will generally be under-regulation in international 
business).  
44 See id.  
45 See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. 
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2. Lack of Domestic Authority
As described below, many members of the IOSCO suffer lack of
sufficient authority to obtain necessary information and documents, 
which is particularly problematic when securities regulators can rely 
only on criminal enforcement. 
a. IOSCO Assessment
Effective securities regulators must have the authority to obtain
all necessary information and documents during both supervision 
and enforcement and, if a violation is found, to penalize such 
noncompliance.46 However, securities regulators in many countries 
seem to lack the ability to effectively enforce regulation.47 The greatest 
challenges facing enforcement powers of regulators include (1) a lack 
of independence from the government and its political process, (2) a 
lack of legal authority, and (3) a lack of resources, all of which prevent 
the operation of an effective and credible enforcement program.48  
The greatest challenges can be seen in many countries where 
securities regulators lack authority or have difficulties in accessing 
information from nonregulated persons.49 Also, in some jurisdictions, 
securities regulators lack comprehensive investigative and enforcement 
authority, such as the ability to enter premises for investigation and 
compel testimony from individuals.50 Many securities regulators have 
to rely on the criminal authorities and sanctions,51 which could hinder 
their credibility and effectiveness, as discussed in the next subsection. 
Even in jurisdictions with adequate supervisory programs, scarce 
disciplinary powers and a lack of skilled personnel are consistent 
problems.52  
46 Carvajal & Elliot, supra note 11, at 19. 
47 This is according to the assessment of regulatory systems of seventy-four countries 
conducted by the IOSCO between 1999 and 2007. Id. at 9. The assessment is not publicly 
available, but a working paper prepared by the IMF analysts shows a detailed analysis of 
the assessment. Id. at 10. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 15; see also Mann & Barry, supra note 24, at 667 (observing that regulators 
usually do not have access to all information). 
50 Carvajal & Elliot, supra note 11, at 19. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
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b. Problems in Criminal Enforcement
Many securities regulators have only the authority to impose
criminal sanctions,53 but enforcing criminal sanctions has its own set 
of problems.54 Ideally, securities regulators would have a variety of 
enforcement tools so they could pursue enforcement remedies or 
sanctions best suited for a variety of cases and to sufficiently deter 
wrongdoing. For example, the SEC can use various enforcement tools 
in criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings.55  
Even if securities regulators can use both criminal and 
administrative enforcement tools, in some countries criminal and 
administrative authorities cannot easily share information because 
they are not considered counterparts.56 Administrative regulators 
usually do not have the authority to prosecute and must rely on a 
separate criminal authority with prosecutorial jurisdiction.57 Criminal 
authorities generally have to focus their limited resources on a select 
number of cases, such as the most egregious or high-profile ones.58 The 
heightened burden of proof in criminal proceedings may prevent many 
cases from being initiated.59 Criminal prosecutors may not have 
expertise in very technical areas of securities regulation.60  
In the hypothetical case presented in the Introduction, if X can only 
use criminal proceedings to regulate conduct by the residents of X, 
then, X may refrain from imposing criminal sanctions on the conduct. 
This could be because the conduct is not sufficiently culpable if illegal 
profits gained by the conduct are nominal. X may also be hindered 
due to the large amount of time it takes to pursue criminal charges 
because of the demanding procedures generally required in criminal 
investigations. Y’s possible sanction, whether criminal, civil, or 
administrative, may not be effective upon the wrongdoer who resides 
in a foreign country. This is because the wrongdoer may ignore Y’s 
order and move to a different market. Thus, even when there is an 
53 Id. 
54 See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
55 See supra Section I.B (describing the SEC’s enforcement tools). 
56 Carvajal & Elliot, supra note 14, at 18. 
57 Id. at 19. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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overlap in legislation, there might be a regulatory gap where no 
authority exists that can exercise effective regulation. 
3. Shortcomings in International Cooperation
The law governing domestic securities regulators’ participation in
international cooperation has continued to evolve, but the law is “not 
fully harmonized with international . . . initiatives.”61 Many countries 
face barriers that prevent securities regulators from fully cooperating 
with foreign authorities.62 The MoUs also expressly recognize that 
there may be limitations on the ability of securities regulators under 
domestic laws.63  
According to a survey conducted by the IOSCO, about forty 
percent of member jurisdictions have encountered challenges in their 
ability to share information and documents with other domestic and 
foreign securities regulators.64 Those challenges include (1) the lack 
of authority to share confidential information such as banking 
information; (2) the condition of “dual illegality,” which requires that 
conduct be illegal in both requesting and requested countries; and 
(3) the lack of authority to share information regarding criminal
matters.65
In some countries, there are no clear provisions that allow regulators 
to share information and documents at the domestic level.66 In addition, 
some securities regulators have not actively participated in effective 
mechanisms for cross-border coordination and the exchange of 
information.67 Differing perceptions of whether a legal proceeding is 
criminal, civil, or administrative will “impact evidence gathering and 
information sharing between [securities] regulators.”68 In addition, 
securities regulators that have not actively enforced their own market 
61 Mann & Barry, supra note 24, at 668.  
62 Id. at 687. 
63 Id. For example, Article 6(e) of the MMoU provides that “[a] request for assistance 
may be denied by the Requested Authority [(meaning a regulator that received a request for 
assistance)]: (i) where the request would require the Requested Authority to act in a manner 
that would violate domestic law.” MMoU, supra note 33, at Art. 6(e).  
64 Carvajal & Elliot, supra note 11, at 20. 
65 Id. at 36. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Mann & Barry, supra note 24, at 668.  
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misconduct regulations may not be supportive of foreign regulators 
either.69  
4. Problems of Regulatory Gap
Even if every securities regulator filled the domestic regulatory
gaps, fraudsters could structure cross-border securities transactions 
and evade regulation. If laws do not hold fraudsters accountable and 
defrauded investors cannot seek adequate remedies, investors will lose 
confidence in securities markets, and integrity will be compromised.70 
This situation also negatively affects liquidity and prices in securities 
markets around the world.71 
B. Solutions for Regulatory Gap
What can securities regulators, as an international group, do to solve 
the cross-border regulatory gaps? Here, I propose three actions that can 
be taken to overcome regulatory gaps: (1) taking initiative to improve 
“weak” regulation; (2) strengthening international cooperation; and 
(3) introducing civil or administrative enforcement.
1. Improvement of Weak Regulation
Securities regulators’ own initiative should improve their “weak”
regulation, such as issues of territoriality and lack of domestic 
authority. However, the IOSCO may take initiative by introducing best 
practices so that “weak” regulators can improve their regulation by 
following the best practices. For example, in response to regulatory 
gaps in relation to hedge funds, the IOSCO promulgated sets of 
principles and best practices to promote transparency of the hedge fund 
industry while preserving liquidity that hedge funds provide to the 
market.72 Also, in response to regulatory gaps caused by technological 
69 Chien-Chung Lin, Insider Trading Law in East Asia and Enforcement: Japan, 
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan Visite § III.2, § IV.1 (July 17, 2013) (unpublished paper) 
https://works.bepress.com/chien_chung_lin/6/. For example, in China, though insider 
trading has been prohibited since the early 1990s, “enforcement had been inactive for a long 
period” until around 2010. Id. § III.2. 
70 Beyea, supra note 10, at 154. 
71 Id. 
72 Cecilia C. Lee, Reframing Complexity: Hedge Fund Policy Paradigm for the Way 
Forward, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 478, 514, n.201 (2015).  
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developments, the IOSCO prepared a report assessing challenges posed 
by technological changes such as the increased speed of trading.73 
2. Strengthening of International Cooperation
In response to shortcomings of international cooperation, the
ultimate solution to reduce regulatory gaps is to strengthen the 
existing international cooperation framework. The IOSCO has already 
started strengthening the existing framework. In February 2016, 
the President’s Committee of the IOSCO endorsed a draft to amend 
the MMoU, which provides the framework for additional assistance 
in areas including the following: (a) sharing auditing information, 
(b) sharing subscriber records held or maintained by telephone service
providers, (c) sharing subscriber records held or maintained by internet
service providers, (d) sharing recordings of telephone conversations
or other electronic communications held or maintained by regulated
persons, (e) compelling a person’s physical attendance to take or
compel that person’s statement or testimony under oath, and
(f) freezing assets.74
Also, international cooperation described in Section III.C.2 below as
a solution for regulatory overlap should work in reducing regulatory 
gaps.75 For example, securities regulators can discuss at an early stage 
who is best suited to pursue enforcement. The regulators consider 
various factors such as whether extraterritorial application of domestic 
securities regulation would be allowed, and which regulator has 
stronger interest, expertise, and resources.  
3. Introduction of Civil or Administrative Enforcement
Another solution for regulatory gaps would be to introduce civil or
administrative enforcement to supplement criminal enforcement. In 
this context, introduction of civil or administrative enforcement to 
compensate for shortcomings of criminal enforcement in Australia and 
Japan provide great examples.76  
73 INT’L ORG. SEC. COMM’NS, TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE MARKET 
SURVEILLANCE ISSUES AND REGULATORY TOOLS (2013), https://www.iosco.org/library/ 
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD412.pdf.  
74 See Int’l Org. Sec. Comm’ns Res. 2/2016 (Feb. 2016), https://www.iosco.org/library/ 
resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES60.pdf.  
75 Id. § IV.C.2. 
76 See Carvajal & Elliot, supra note 14 (arguing that it is necessary for securities 
regulators to have an option to directly prosecute matters in civil or administrative 
proceedings). 
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The IOSCO could share these best practices of introducing 
administrative enforcement with regulators that have solely relied on 
criminal enforcement. In the hypothetical case presented in the 
Introduction, for example, X and Y may conduct parallel administrative 
and criminal investigations where X seeks to impose a criminal 
sanction on the investor residing within its jurisdiction and Y seeks to 
impose an administrative monetary penalty on the investor. By doing 
so, X and Y together can send a strong message to the markets. Also, 
even if X fails or takes too much time to impose the criminal sanction, 
the investor may be deterred from further misconduct by Y’s prompt 
action. Moreover, if Y only had criminal enforcement, X might 
be prohibited under its domestic laws from sharing self-incriminating 
evidence obtained from the investor. But, introduction of 
administrative enforcement by Y would enable such information 
sharing.  
a. Australia’s Civil Penalty
In Australia, a civil penalty regime was introduced in 1993, aiming
to reduce the role of criminal penalties, which applied only to the most 
serious misconduct.77 The Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) had faced difficulties in enforcement because only 
criminal penalties were available.78 The ASIC considered that the need 
to satisfy criminal rules of evidence and the higher standard of proof in 
criminal proceedings made criminal penalties an inefficient and 
inflexible enforcement tool for securities regulation.79 The civil penalty 
regime, therefore, was introduced for the ASIC to reduce reliance on 
the criminal penalties and to deal more effectively with misconduct.80 
The ASIC has succeeded in many civil cases, particularly in corporate 
enforcement.81 
Due to enhanced procedural protections afforded to defendants, 
however, the ASIC’s ability to rely on the civil penalty regime has been 
undermined.82 In Australia, civil penalties are considered a “hybrid 
77 Vicky Comino, Effective Regulation by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission: The Civil Penalty Problem, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 802, 804 (2009). 
78 Id. at 805. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 810. 
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between the civil and the criminal law” and “punitive civil sanctions.”83 
As a consequence, the defendants in civil penalty proceedings are 
awarded the penalty privilege, a weak form of the privilege against self-
incrimination.84 In addition, the standard of proof for civil penalty 
proceedings requires a higher level of proof than the one for ordinary 
civil proceedings.85 The courts must find that a violation has occurred 
and that the consequences are serious.86 These procedures should be 
changed so that civil enforcement can be as effective a tool as 
administrative enforcement,87 which is discussed next. 
b. Japan’s Administrative Monetary Penalty
In Japan, the administrative monetary penalty system for market
misconduct was introduced in 2005 “to conduct investigations to 
impose administrative monetary penalties to the SESC.”88 The measure 
is intended to achieve “the administrative objective of preventing 
misconduct and ensuring effectiveness of the regulation.”89 If the 
Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) finds 
market misconduct, it may make a recommendation to the Prime 
Minister and the Commissioner of the Financial Services Agency to 
issue an order to pay an administrative monetary penalty through an 
administrative trial procedure.90 
The SESC has actively used administrative monetary penalties to 
police market misconduct. Between fiscal years 2014 and 2018, the 
number of recommendations for administrative monetary penalties 
were one hundred and twenty-six cases for insider trading and forty-
one cases for market manipulation.91 During the same period, the 
83 Id. at 811 (citing Rich v. Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 
220 CLR 129, 172 (Austl.); JOHN FARRAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORIES, 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 245 (3d ed. 2008)). But see id. at 813 (quoting Vicky Comino, 
The Challenge of Corporate Law Enforcement in Australia, 23 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 233, 248 
(2009)) (arguing that the imposition of civil penalties does not implicate the same level of 
moral culpability and does not have the same level of deterrent effects as criminal penalties, 
so the civil penalties are not punitive in nature). 
84 Id. at 811, 815. 
85 Id. at 820. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. at 829–30 (claiming that legislatures should enact a “new procedural road-
map” to govern the law and procedure of the civil penalty proceedings). 
88 SEC. & EXCH. SURVEILLANCE COMM’N, INITIATIVES: BUILDING ON A QUARTER-
CENTURY OF ACHIEVEMENT 6 (2016), http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/aboutsesc/all.pdf.  
89 Id. at 7.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 21. 
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number of criminal charges filed by the SESC was only twelve for 
insider trading and eight for market manipulation.92  
The administrative monetary penalties have been used in some novel 
and challenging cases by the SESC. For example, some of the cases 
involved market manipulation made by automatic orders placed by 
algorithmic traders or though orders placed with multiple securities 
brokers.93 There was also a case where market manipulation was 
conducted through transactions on both a proprietary trading system 
(PTS), which is a market trading system established and operated by a 
securities firm, and a major stock exchange.94 In that case, a trader 
placed false orders before the opening of the morning session of the 
stock exchange, thereby boosting quotations, and executed orders on 
the PTS.95 The SESC might not have been able to enforce against these 
cases if it had relied solely on its criminal investigative proceedings, 
which are used in a limited number of cases and require the highest 
burden of proof.96 
III 
REGULATORY OVERLAP 
In this Article, a “regulatory overlap” means securities regulators in 
more than two jurisdictions try to regulate the same course of conduct 
in a particular single market. In this Part, I clarify when a regulatory 
overlap occurs in international business and securities regulation 
generally, analyze how the existence of a regulatory overlap causes 
problems for market participants and securities regulators, and propose 
solutions that securities regulators can employ.  
A. Sources of Regulatory Overlap
A regulatory overlap may occur in two settings: (1) when multiple 
regulators try to enforce their regulations concurrently,97 and (2) when 
92 Id. 
93 SEC. & EXCH. SURVEILLANCE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2015/2016 120 (2016), 
http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/reports/re2015.pdf. 
94 Id. at 122. 
95 Id.  
96 See supra Section II.A.2.b (explaining difficulties in criminal enforcement).  
97 Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of 
American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 235 (1996). 
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a regulator tries to enforce its regulation as a “carbon copy” 
enforcement after another regulator has enforced its regulation.98  
1. Concurrent Jurisdiction
Historically, regulators may have been limited in applying their own
domestic laws by the principle of territoriality.99 Currently, however, 
a certain degree of extraterritorial application is generally accepted, 
though the proper basis and scope of such application are still 
debated.100 In this subsection, I examine tests for extraterritorial 
application such as the conduct and effect tests, I discuss a seminal 
United States Supreme Court case that introduced the transaction test 
and a material federal statute on extraterritorial application, and I 
examine how the SEC exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
a. Conduct and Effects Tests
In the United States, the Second Circuit, and other federal courts,
has developed the “conduct” and the “effects” tests.101 Under the 
conduct test, courts will have subject matter jurisdiction when 
“substantial acts in furtherance of the fraud” occurred in the United 
States.102 In order to satisfy the conduct test, “(1) the defendant’s 
activities in the United States [must be] more than ‘merely preparatory’ 
to a securities fraud conducted elsewhere, and (2) these activities or 
culpable failures to act within the United States [must have] ‘directly 
caused’ the claimed losses.”103  
While the conduct test focuses on the place of the conduct, the 
effects test focuses on harm to U.S. markets or investors. Under the 
effects test, the U.S. courts will have subject matter jurisdiction when 
“the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or 
upon United States citizens.”104 Effects must be strong enough to 
98 See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. 
99 See Beyea, supra note 10, at 145 (citing Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 
347, 357 (1909)).  
100 See Beyea, supra note 10, at 145 (citing Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New 
Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883 (2002)). 
101 Beyea, supra note 10, at 146–47. 
102 Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983).  
103 Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal citation 
omitted). 
104 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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generate “foreseeable and substantial harm to interests in the United 
States,”105 and mere adverse effects are insufficient.106  
The conduct test and the effects test were criticized as risking 
unsettled and excessive expansion of national laws that could infringe 
upon other sovereigns, and thereby harm international relations.107 
Under the conduct test, when significant conduct occurs in multiple 
jurisdictions, all jurisdictions may have enough activity within their 
borders to exercise jurisdiction.108 This is particularly true for securities 
transactions.109 Similarly, cross-border securities transactions likely 
have an effect in multiple jurisdictions, so the effects test also allows 
extraterritorial application by multiple jurisdictions.  
b. Morrison Decision and the Dodd-Frank Act
Recognizing the risk of unsettled and excessive expansion of
national laws, the United States Supreme Court overruled the conduct 
test and the effects test and introduced a new test, the transactional 
test.110 The Court held in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. that 
Section 10(b) applied to fraudulent action involving “transactions in 
securities listed on domestic exchanges” and “domestic transactions in 
other securities.”111 The Court reasoned that the conduct test and the 
effects test were problematic because the tests made it very difficult to 
anticipate when anti-fraud provisions applied to a transaction.112  
The Morrison decision, however, made a loophole for fraudsters.113 
A person who violated U.S. securities regulations could avoid 
application of anti-fraud provisions by executing trading outside the 
United States.114 The U.S. Congress added a new provision in the 
Dodd-Frank Act to close the loophole. Under Section 929P(b) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC and the DOJ may exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction against “conduct within the United States that constitutes 
105 Tamari v. Bache & Co. S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984). 
106 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975). 
107 Park, supra note 8, at 73. 
108 Choi & Guzman, supra note 97, at 218. 
109 Id. 
110 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 268 (2010).  
111 Id. at 267. 
112 Id. at 257–61. 
113 See Park, supra note 8, at 77 (providing an example where a chemist obtained 
confidential information from the U.S. FDA and traded securities on a Chinese exchange). 
114 Id. 
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significant steps in furtherance of the violation” or “conduct occurring 
outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within 
the United States.”115 Therefore, even if conduct does not meet the 
transaction test, the SEC and the DOJ can exercise extraterritorial 
application of anti-fraud provisions under the Dodd-Frank Act by using 
the effects or conduct test.116 
Potential issues remain in cross-border cases with overlapping 
jurisdictions. Because Section 929P(b) mirrors words used in cases 
before Morrison, the meaning of phrases such as “significant steps in 
furtherance of the violation” and “a foreseeable substantial effect” are 
still unclear.117 Because the test leaves a lot of ambiguity, a court can 
make decisions. Depending on the specific facts in a particular case, 
the SEC and the DOJ can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
arbitrarily even when the United States’ interest is only nominal.118 
This, in turn, could lead to regulatory overlaps if the claims by the SEC 
or the DOJ, based on the conduct or the effects test, overlap with claims 
from foreign regulators.119 
c. Practice of the SEC
Many of the SEC’s cross-border market misconduct cases used to
be “simply the outgrowths of cases that were primarily domestic in 
nature.”120 Recently, however, market misconduct has increasingly 
involved significant overseas conduct, and “the jurisdictional nexus 
between the suspicious conduct and U.S. markets is increasingly 
attenuated.”121  
For example, Security and Exchange Commission v. Tiger Asia 
Management is an insider trading case in which a U.S. resident, Sung 
Kook Hwang, the founder and portfolio manager of U.S.-based Tiger 
Asia Management and Tiger Asia Partners (Tiger Asia), is alleged to 
115 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(b) (2015). Note that the transaction test still applies to private 
parties. 
116 Id. Note that the transaction test still applies to litigation by private parties.  
117 Park, supra note 8, at 80. 
118 Id. at 80–81. 
119 See id. at 81 (stating “[t]he effects and conduct tests restored by the Dodd-Frank Act 
result in claims that overlap with those of other countries’ transactional tests”). 
120 Michael Feldberg, U.S. Insider Trading Enforcement Goes Global, HARV. L. SCH.  
F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 26, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2013/05/26/u-s-insider-trading-enforcement-goes-global/ (describing trends in parallel
proceedings in insider trading cases).
121 Id. (observing insider trading cases where the nexus with the U.S. markets was 
attenuated). 
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have ordered trading of a Chinese bank’s shares listed on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange, knowing insider information regarding private 
placements.122 After the parallel criminal and civil proceedings in the 
United States, Tiger Asia agreed to pay a total of USD $44 million 
in disgorgement and penalties.123 Even though this matter involved 
substantial conduct in the United States (e.g., obtaining insider 
information and placing orders in the United States), the market harmed 
by the conduct was in Hong Kong.124 The Hong Kong regulator, 
however, gave up a criminal investigation of the matter because the 
DOJ had already secured a criminal conviction against the firm.125 
This case illustrates that a securities regulator with a strong interest 
may be prevented from prosecuting securities violations because of 
enforcement by another securities regulator.  
There is a good example of regulatory overlap and cooperation in a 
cross-border insider trading case in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. In SEC v. McClellan, a partner of an accounting firm and the 
partner’s wife, both of whom were residents of the United States, 
allegedly leaked confidential merger and acquisition information from 
the partner’s clients to the partner and his wife’s family members in the 
United Kingdom.126 The family members then either took financial 
positions in shares of U.S. companies or leaked the information to 
colleagues.127 The SEC, the DOJ, and the U.K. Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) conducted parallel investigations into the matter.128 
The SEC filed insider trading charges against the partner and his wife, 
122 Complaint at 1–2, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tiger Asia Mgmt., et al., No. 12-cv-7601 
(DMC) (Dec 12, 2012).  
123 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tiger Asia Mgmt., et al., No. 12-cv-7601 (DMC) (Dec. 13, 
2012).  
124 See id. In some other cases, the SEC exercised its jurisdiction where substantial 
conduct occurred only outside the United States. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Freezes Assets in Swiss-Based Account Used in Suspected Insider Trading 
Ahead of Heinz Acquisition (Feb. 15, 2013) (involving suspicious trading by unknown 
foreign traders ahead of the public announcement of the acquisition of Heinz).  
125 Hong Kong law prohibits a prosecution when there is a final judgment of acquittal or 
conviction in another country under the international double jeopardy doctrine. VICTOR HO 
WAI-KIN, CRIMINAL LAW IN HONG KONG 58 (Kluwer Law International, 2011). 
126 Litigation Release No. 21758, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. 
McClellan, Case No. CV-105412 (JCS) (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 30, 2010) [hereinafter SEC 
Litigation Release].  
127 Id. 
128 Press Release, Fed. Sec. Agency, FSA, SEC and DOJ Investigation Leads to Two 
People Being Charged by the SEC with Insider Dealing in the U.S. (Dec. 1, 2010).  
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but not against the family members in the United Kingdom.129 The 
FSA, on the other hand, charged five individuals in the United 
Kingdom who either traded shares of the U.S. companies or disclosed 
the information to others130 for violation of Section 52 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1993.131 The SEC took a civil enforcement action against 
U.S. residents while the FSA filed criminal charges against U.K. 
residents.132 This case shows that the problem of duplicate recovery, 
discussed in Section B.1 below, may be overcome if affected regulators 
can take actions against different parties. 
2. Carbon Copy Prosecution
Regulatory overlaps exist not only when two securities regulators
exercise jurisdiction concurrently but also when there is a follow-up 
“carbon copy” prosecution, which is defined as “successive, 
duplicative prosecutions by multiple sovereigns for conduct 
transgressing the laws of several nations, but arising out of the same 
common nucleus of operative facts.”133 Some practitioners observed 
that in recent cases under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
while the United States was the global anti-corruption leader, a 
corporation reaching a negotiated resolution with U.S. authorities faced 
the risk that other countries would initiate prosecutions based on the 
same facts.134 More jurisdictions have been actively enacting and 
enforcing their own local anti-corruption laws.135 “As globalization 
makes the world smaller . . . carbon-copy prosecutions will increase in 
frequency, size, scope, and force.”136 
An empirical analysis found strong statistical correlation between 
extraterritoriality and national policy implementation: the odds of a 
129 SEC Litigation Release, supra note 126. The SEC later settled with the wife and filed 
a request for dismissal of claims against the partner. Id.  
130 Press Release, Fed. Sec. Agency, Five Charged with Insider Dealing (Nov. 25, 2010) 
[hereinafter FSA Press Release]. 
131 Criminal Justice Act 1993, § 52 (Eng.). 
132 SEC Litigation Release, supra note 126; FSA Press Release, supra note 130. 
133 Andrew S. Boutros & T. Markus Funk, “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions: A Growing 
Anticorruption Phenomenon in a Shrinking World, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 259, 269 (2012). 
134 See id. at 260 (providing a case in which Nigerian authorities sought criminal 
penalties from a U.S. company that had settled with the DOJ). 
135 Id. at 270. 
136 Id. at 298; see also Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of 
the Law: Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery 
Legislation, 65 INT’L ORG. 745, 745 (2011) (observing that even though legal systems and 
sovereignty were traditionally territorial, courts and regulators have applied and enforced 
national law to conduct transpiring outside their physical territory). 
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country enforcing its first anti-corruption case were twenty times 
greater if a country had experienced extraterritorial application of the 
FCPA.137 The correlation suggests that powerful regulators in larger 
markets can induce political activism in other jurisdictions where 
enforcement is weak, because the “stronger” regulator may provide 
legitimacy and attention to advocates and opponents of ruling 
parties.138 Also, decisions from strong regulators such as the DOJ and 
the SEC may have multiplying but unintentional spillover effects, 
altering national decision-making in other jurisdictions.139 “Weaker” 
regulators may follow “stronger” regulators simply in order to collect 
substantial penalties from wealthy corporations. While carbon copy 
prosecutions of market misconduct may have a positive effect by 
helping “weaker” jurisdictions step up, and by not disturbing other 
regulators, there may be problems such as increased compliance costs 
for market participants and duplicative recovery, as described below. 
B. Problems of Regulatory Overlap
Regulatory overlaps could potentially cause problems not only for 
market participants such as investors and issuers through increased 
compliance costs but also for regulators themselves through 
disturbance of each other’s enforcement.140  
1. Increased Compliance Costs
The cost of compliance could be burdensome to foreign issuers
because they may have to comply with all rules of relevant 
jurisdictions, which may contradict each other.141 Foreign issuers 
would be concerned about the uncertainty of potential liability under 
U.S. anti-fraud provisions, and the concern would have a chilling effect 
on their economic activities in the United States because foreign issuers 
137 Boutros & Funk, supra note 133, at 747. 
138 Id. at 748–50.  
139 Id. at 765. 
140 See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An 
Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L. J. 101, 152 (1998) (claiming that 
disadvantages are conflicts with foreign nations and undue burdens on international business 
actors).  
141 See Beyea, supra note 10, at 155 (pointing out the effect of uncertainty regarding 
extraterritorial application); Trachtman, supra note 38, at 643 (claiming that regulatory 
overlaps could increase compliance costs or be contradictory). 
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may limit their business142 or try to keep material information outside 
the United States.143 Foreign regulators may also refrain from 
cooperating with U.S. regulators if they learn that their targets are 
domestic nationals whose conduct occurred only outside the United 
States.144  
Regulatory overlaps may also result in duplicate or excessive 
sanctions if each regulator or court gives no consideration to sanctions 
imposed in other jurisdictions.145 Regulators may be criticized for 
penalties that are too harsh and beyond what is required for appropriate 
deterrence of market misconduct. Regulators need to “ensure that 
proposed sanctions concerning the same/similar misconduct give 
a coherent message so as to achieve credible deterrence, while 
preventing a defendant from being unfairly penalized.”146 
2. Disturbance of Other Regulators
Regulatory overlaps can be costly for not only market participants
but also for regulators themselves.147 One regulator’s exercise of 
extraterritorial enforcement may disturb investigation or enforcement 
by other regulators for two main reasons.  
First, extraterritorial enforcement can prevent other regulators from 
continuing enforcement due to international double jeopardy concerns. 
In jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Canada, a prosecution 
in one country is prohibited when there is a final judgment of acquittal 
or conviction in another country under the international double 
jeopardy principle.148 Therefore, if regulators in two jurisdictions, both 
142 See Beyea, supra note 10, at 155 (claiming that if Morrison court had upheld the 
conduct and effects test broadly, many foreign issues would have been discouraged from 
investing). 
143 Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It 
Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 217 (2011).  
144 See id. 
145 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities 
Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 60 (2007) 
(observing that a court in one jurisdiction may not condition settlement or judgment on 
release of all future claims).  
146 Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns (IOSCO), Joint Cross-Border Investigations and Related 
Proceedings, at 23 (Feb. 2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter IOSCO Report]. 
147 See Beyea, supra note 10, at 156 (emphasizing the burden of regulators when other 
regulators try to exercise jurisdiction on a tenuous contact).  
148 See Colangelo, supra note 5, at 817–18 (describing the international double jeopardy 
principle in the United Kingdom and Canada). In the United States, however, under the dual 
sovereignty doctrine, even if a defendant has already been convicted or acquitted in a foreign 
country, the defendant may be tried again for the same offense. See United States v. 
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of which recognize the international double jeopardy principle, 
investigate the same matter, the regulator who convicts first can prevent 
the other from prosecuting. Regulators should avoid a situation where 
a regulator concludes an action that may nullify the action of other 
jurisdictions. These circumstances may also allow wrongdoers to 
engage in forum shopping to find the most favorable jurisdiction.149 
Second, even in cases where no double jeopardy concerns are 
implicated, investigations and enforcement by multiple regulators on 
the same person can adversely affect each other. For example, one 
regulator’s decision to seek settlement might have a “significant 
bearing” upon other regulators because “the litigation posture of a 
person charged with a violation may alter considerably” after the 
settlement.150 It may also lead to an inadvertent disclosure of the 
investigation when one regulator’s investigation gives premature 
notice to wrongdoers, giving them an opportunity to hide material 
evidence or conspire with relevant parties. In addition, if one regulator 
compels a wrongdoer to appear or produce documents, both of which 
take time, the other regulator might be prevented from contacting the 
person in a timely manner. Sharing of information between the two 
regulators may also be difficult.151  
C. Solutions
Given increasingly integrated securities markets, it is increasingly 
challenging for regulators to avoid inefficient regulatory overlaps while 
filling regulatory gaps.152 Here, I propose two solutions so that 
regulators can maintain the integrity of the markets while avoiding 
overburdening investors and other regulators. One solution is to limit 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to a reasonable level, and the other is to 
Richardson, 580 F.2d 946, 947 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that Guatemalan convictions did not 
bar prosecution by the United States). 
149 See Beyea, supra note 10, at 156 (arguing that, if the intensity of enforcement or 
available remedies are diversified, investors may engage in forum shopping to find the most 
favorable jurisdiction in which to bring their suit). 
150 IOSCO Report, supra note 146, at 22. 
151 When multiple regulators try to share documents and information from a defendant, 
the protections and rights available in each jurisdiction may be different. Information 
exchange may be hindered depending on what type of proceedings are pursued.  
152 See Beyea, supra note 10, at 154 (explaining the difficulty to regulate securities 
markets by sufficiently preventing transnational securities misconduct while avoiding costly 
and inefficient overregulation). 
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coordinate enforcement actions through the international cooperation 
framework.  
1. Limitation of Extraterritorial Application
Because extraterritorial application of U.S. securities regulation
imposes a costly burden on capital mobility,153 various approaches 
have been proposed to limit extraterritorial application as I describe in 
this section. Given the increasing cross-border securities transactions, 
however, some extraterritoriality is inevitable. The question is, 
therefore, how far one’s jurisdiction should reach. Instead of rule-based 
approaches such as the market-based approach and the modified 
market-based approach described below, I propose that securities 
regulators should decide, by mutual consultation, whether 
extraterritorial application is reasonable on a case-by-case basis. 
a. Market-Based Approach
Under the market-based approach, the law of the jurisdiction where
a transaction occurs should apply to the transaction, so the approach 
bars application of U.S. anti-fraud provisions if investors trade 
securities on a foreign securities exchange.154 The approach argues that 
regulators should only be concerned about conduct that has effects 
within their jurisdiction.155 It also argues that rational investors and 
issuers can choose securities markets where regulation is at the optimal 
level, thereby maximizing global welfare.156  
The market-based approach provides certainty as to the applicable 
law by giving only one jurisdiction the power to enforce securities 
regulations, thereby avoiding regulatory overlaps and accompanying 
costs.157 This approach, however, may not work in regulating market 
misconduct. Market misconduct in one place may have an adverse 
effect in other places, so regulators have a strong interest in regulating 
misconduct regardless of the jurisdiction of the direct effects.158  
153 See supra Section III.B. 
154 See, e.g., Choi & Guzman, supra note 97, at 222 (claiming that any transactions 
occurring in a foreign jurisdiction should follow the law of that jurisdiction). 
155 See Beyea, supra note 10, at 157 (observing that the approach focuses on the effects, 
and it would result in discarding the conduct test). 
156 See id. (observing that under the approach the best way to maximize global welfare 
is to rely on securities markets to select the optimal level of regulation). 
157 See id. (observing that the approach will reduce the costs of offering securities and 
in turn allow the better price of securities for investors).  
158 See id. (explaining that securities markets are interconnected, and regulators have 
interest in deterring fraud that does not directly harm their markets).  
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b. Modified Market-Based Approach
Under the modified market-based approach, the law of the
jurisdiction where a transaction occurs should presumptively apply to 
the transaction, but the presumption is rebuttable if the SEC can 
determine that a jurisdiction lacks effective anti-fraud enforcement.159 
Securities law Professor Choi and conflicts law Professor Silverman 
reason that jurisdiction should be based on the country that regulated 
the market where the transaction took place, and U.S. courts should 
presumptively exclude foreign investors who engage in transactions in 
non-U.S. markets from U.S. class-action lawsuits.160 They also argue 
that the SEC, not the courts, has the expertise to make a case-by-case 
judgment about the effectiveness of the securities regulatory system in 
other jurisdictions.161  
The approach should provide greater certainty to not only U.S. but 
also foreign issuers and investors without unduly conflicting with 
interests of other jurisdictions.162 This approach may also be practical 
because it will limit the role of judges and reduce the possibility that 
different judges will make inconsistent decisions.163  
Limiting extraterritorial application of U.S. anti-fraud provisions 
may reduce criticisms of the U.S. approach, but the overall issues of 
regulatory overlap will not be solved unless all jurisdictions adopt the 
market-based approach.164 Moreover, limiting application can result in 
overly broad extraterritorial application if the SEC considers regulation 
in other jurisdictions to be insufficient, which is likely in many cases.165 
c. “Reasonable” Extraterritorial Application
As described in Section III.A.1.b above, theoretically both the SEC
and the DOJ could apply anti-fraud provisions extraterritorially based 
on the effects or conduct test under the Dodd-Frank Act. There are, 
however, strong arguments that such exercise should be more restricted 
159 See generally Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and 
Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465 (2009).  
160 Id. at 492–93.  
161 Id. at 503. 
162 See Beyea, supra note 10, at 159 (noting that the modified approach is better). 
163 Choi & Silberman, supra note 159, at 500–01.  
164 See Beyea, supra note 10, at 159 (stating that “the overall problem of a transaction 
being subject to multiple regulatory systems would not go away.”). 
165 Id. 
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or at least limited to a “reasonable” level. For example, securities law 
Professor Chang argues that a U.S. court’s jurisdiction should be 
limited to cases where the interests of U.S. investors and markets are 
sufficiently affected by foreign transactions.166 Similarly, securities 
law Professor Painter argues that application of U.S. insider trading 
law would be justifiable when misappropriated information is used in 
the United States.167 He reasons that such misappropriation would 
undermine the integrity of U.S. securities markets, but the U.S. interest 
in enforcement would be attenuated if only the misappropriation, but 
not the trading, occurs in the United States.168  
Attempts to unilaterally police international markets through overly 
aggressive extraterritorial application of its laws could destroy the 
goodwill toward international cooperation and diminish respect for the 
rules and customs of foreign markets.169 On the other hand, to eliminate 
regulatory overlaps by completely abandoning the extraterritorial 
application of broad anti-fraud rules, such as Rule 10b-5, can result in 
another significant problem, a regulatory gap.170 The ideal solution, 
therefore, is for securities regulators to cooperate and coordinate to 
minimize issues caused by regulatory overlap and regulatory gaps. 
Assertions of a “reasonable” level of extraterritorial application of U.S. 
securities regulation may encourage international cooperation and lead 
to more agreements among securities regulators to resolve conflicts.171 
2. International Cooperation and Coordinated Enforcement
Securities regulators can cooperate and coordinate to achieve a
“reasonable” level of extraterritorial application of their securities laws 
through their existing international cooperative framework, the IOSCO 
and the MMoU. In securities regulation, there seems to be unanimous 
agreement among regulators, academics, market participants, and 
practitioners that the regulatory framework for international securities 
transactions requires regulators to coordinate and cooperate with each 
166 Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need 
for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 
9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 120–21 (2003).  
167 Painter, supra note 143, at 220.  
168 Id.  
169 See Chang, supra note 166, at 118 (claiming that exercise of extraterritorial 
application over cross-border transactions would implicate significant policy issues). 
170 See supra Section II.A.4 (describing problems caused by regulatory gaps). 
171 Beyea, supra note 10, at 166.  
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other.172 There is, however, little agreement as to what form such 
international cooperation should take.173  
In determining whether to exercise jurisdiction, the legitimate 
interests and concerns of other regulators should be recognized so that 
it does not conflict with their ability to regulate.174 “Where regulators 
in multiple jurisdictions have an interest in the same suspected 
misconduct, they may wish to pursue a joint investigation and/or 
coordinate enforcement action[,]. . . take advantage of their respective 
powers to obtain information[, and] benefit from the ability to conduct 
a more comprehensive cross-border investigation.”175 
One of the notable examples of successful coordinated enforcement 
can be seen in the field of anti-corruption—a global settlement by 
Siemens for the violation of anti-bribery provisions—which exceeded 
USD $1.6 billion in disgorgement and fines.176 There, the SEC 
leveraged the prior investigation of German prosecutors and conducted 
a further joint investigation, and together, the SEC, the DOJ, and the 
Office of the Prosecutor General in Munich reached a coordinated 
settlement while the FSA and the HKSFC assisted the investigation.177 
In SEC v. McClellan, described above, the SEC took civil enforcement 
against U.S. residents while the FSA filed criminal charges against 
U.K. residents.178 The problem of duplicate recovery may be overcome 
if affected regulators discuss whether sanctions are complementary or 
contradictory, and enter into a negotiated settlement or take actions 
against different parties to eliminate the possibility of duplicate 
recovery.179 
172 See, e.g., Henry Klehm III et al., Securities Enforcement Has Crossed the Border: 
Regulatory Authorities Respond to the Financial Crisis with a Call for Greater International 
Cooperation, but Where Will That Lead?, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 927, 928 (2011) (observing 
that regulatory authorities worldwide have almost universally agreed to coordinate and 
cooperate with each other). 
173 Beyea, supra note 10, at 160 n.145.  
174 Chang, supra note 166, at 118.  
175 IOSCO Report, supra note 146, at 4. Securities practitioners also requested the 
IOSCO to streamline cross-border enforcement. See generally INT’L BAR ASS’N, REPORT 
OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 300–01 (2009) [hereinafter 
IBA REPORT]. 
176 Klehm et al., supra note 172, at 944–45. 
177 Id. 
178 See supra notes 126–131 and accompanying text.  
179 See Buxbaum, supra note 145, at 60 (claiming that duplicate recovery may be 
avoided by coordination); see also IOSCO Report, supra note 146, at 4–5 (claiming that 
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Choi and Guzman argue that the ideal approach would apply the 
laws of only one jurisdiction.180 An approach to allocate exclusive 
jurisdiction to the country where a harm is recognized,181 however, 
would not work because the mere fact that a harm was suffered does 
not mean that the country is best suited to regulate the conduct.182 
Similarly, many practitioners have argued that a single regulator should 
take the lead in the investigation and prosecution while other regulators 
should defer to the lead regulator because of the interests of comity, 
resources, efficiency, fairness, and a decisive solution.183 It makes 
sense to designate the lead regulator, but the guiding principle of 
coordinated enforcement should not mandate a sole regulator to enforce 
its laws. Instead, the guiding principle should encourage or give 
incentives for all regulators not to pursue their objectives at the expense 
of other regulators.184  
IV 
INTERSECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND 
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 
Many securities regulators have criminal penalties as a tool of 
enforcement but not administrative penalties—which is one of the 
sources for regulatory gaps.185 As discussed above, the introduction of 
administrative enforcement would allow securities regulators to have 
more flexibility and efficiency in their enforcement.186 However, 
administrative enforcement may bring additional risks that require 
attention and cooperation between securities regulators, particularly 
where “quasi-criminal” administrative enforcement tools are used. 
coordinated enforcement will achieve better results by resolving a matter through 
complementary remedies).  
180 Choi & Guzman, supra note 97, at 228–29. 
181 See, e.g., Diane Wood, A Cooperative Framework for National Regulators, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 521, 530 (1996) (“I think that the optimal enforcer for any competition case 
is the country whose consumers are harmed by the particular practice in question.”). 
182 Guzman, supra note 15, at 905.  
183 See, e.g., IBA REPORT, supra note 175, at 301 (urging governments to “agree upon 
a framework that provides for one jurisdiction to be the appropriate jurisdiction”). 
184 See Guzman, supra note 15, at 898 (claiming that the successful choice-of-law 
principle should give incentives to regulators not to pursue their objectives at the expense 
of other countries).  
185 See supra Section II.A.2. 
186 See supra Section II.B.3.  
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A. Challenges in Administrative Enforcement
We need to note that administrative enforcement can cause 
additional issues. First, the lack of various sanctioning powers seems 
to be a common issue among regulators. In some countries, such as 
Australia and Canada, the regulator has direct authority to impose 
“administrative” sanctions on any persons;187 in other countries, such 
as Hong Kong and Singapore, the regulator has direct authority only 
over regulated persons. In these countries, a regulator can file a civil 
action only against nonregulated persons.188 In some countries, such as 
Jamaica, the regulator can seek cease-and-desist orders in court but not 
monetary penalties.189 While in other countries, such as Spain, only the 
government has the authority to impose sanctions for serious breaches 
of securities regulation, and the securities regulator can impose 
sanctions only for minor infringements.190  
Second, even if regulators have the power to impose administrative 
sanctions, the range of available sanctions may not be adequate if they 
are either (1) not severe enough, such as monetary penalties that are too 
low to have any deterrent effects;191 or (2) overly severe, which may be 
the case if de-licensing is the only available sanction.192 In the former 
case, criminal sanctions would still work as effective deterrence. The 
possibility of criminal proceedings, despite the difficulties described 
above, is indispensable for effective deterrence because some sanctions 
such as imprisonment, extradition for trial, and deportation may not be 
available in civil or administrative proceedings.193  
Third, the ability to settle a case is also an important option, but 
in many civil law countries securities regulators do not have that 
authority.194 Settling cases requires the regulators to exercise a certain 
level of confidence and credibility. Without this confidence and 
credibility, parties lack the incentive to settle. However, many 
regulators are not in a position to settle cases regularly even if they have 
187 Carvajal & Elliot, supra note 14, at 19–20. 
188 Id.  
189 Id. at 20. 
190 Id. at 20–21. 
191 Id. at 21. For example, the securities regulator in Finland can only apply a maximum 
fine of €100 regardless of the offense. Id. 
192 Carvajal & Elliot, supra note 11, at 33–34. 
193 Carvajal & Elliot, supra note 14, at 21.  
194 Id. 
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such authority.195 Regulators must have a track record of successful 
enforcement, clear guidelines for settlement, negotiation skills, and 
sufficient political will to vigorously pursue enforcement and withstand 
criticism for not imposing harsher penalties.196  
Fourth, coordination between criminal and administrative 
authorities is also a key to success. Criminal and administrative 
authorities can share information and resources, and they can take 
parallel proceedings as necessary.197 For example, in Singapore, the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and the Commercial Affairs 
Department (CAD) have conducted joint criminal and civil 
investigations since March 2015.198 Previously, the MAS would pursue 
civil investigations independent of the CAD and, in turn, the CAD 
would pursue criminal investigations independent of the MAS.199 As of 
March 2015, the MAS and the CAD can jointly investigate all market 
misconduct and make a decision as to whether a case is subject to 
criminal or civil proceedings when investigations have concluded.200  
In practice, however, coordination and cooperation between 
criminal and administrative authorities remain a challenge in many 
countries.201 Resources may be limited, prosecutors’ interests and 
priorities may vary, and some authorities could also be legally 
constrained from sharing certain kinds of confidential information.202 
Administrative investigators may lack expertise in gathering evidence 
that satisfies the more rigorous requirements of criminal 
proceedings.203 
B. Quasi-Criminal Enforcement?
If a sanction is labeled as “administrative” under domestic laws, it 
could hinder information exchange with regulators that construe a 
sanction as “quasi-criminal”—even raising double jeopardy concerns. 
195 Id.  
196 Id.  
197 Id. at 22.  
198 MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., CAPITAL MARKETS ENFORCEMENT 8 (2016).  
199 Id.  
200 Id. 
201 Carvajal & Elliot, supra note 14, at 22.  
202 Id. Information exchange could also be subject to constitutional limitations such as 
the privilege against self-incrimination. See infra note 214 and accompanying text (a case 
in Hong Kong in which the plaintiff alleged that the Hong Kong regulator unconstitutionally 
provided self-incriminatory evidence to the Japanese regulator).  
203 Carvajal & Elliot, supra note 14, at 22. 
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1. Information Exchange
Regulators need the authority to obtain all the necessary information
and documents for enforcement actions, but international information 
exchange may be hindered when a securities regulator introduces 
“quasi-criminal” sanctions. Some securities regulators may introduce 
administrative penalties to have more flexibility and efficiency in their 
enforcement; other securities regulators that already have an option to 
initiate administrative proceedings may try to strengthen the deterrence 
effect by raising the upper limit of administrative monetary penalties 
as Japan has recently done.204 As a result, though such enforcement 
tools are labeled as “administrative” under certain domestic laws, they 
could be construed as “quasi-criminal” in other jurisdictions, thereby 
implicating constitutional issues such as the privilege against self-
incrimination. The more that administrative penalties are enhanced, the 
more likely they will be deemed quasi-criminal. 
In the United States, parallel proceedings of criminal and 
administrative or civil proceedings are generally allowed.205 However, 
evidence obtained through the less demanding procedures usually 
allowed for administrative investigations may not be used in criminal 
proceedings if the administrative investigations were conducted 
“solely” to obtain evidence for the criminal proceedings.206  
Similar issues may arise in cross-border cooperation. A case in 
Singapore shows how a proceeding can be conceived in a way that 
affects international cooperation.207 Under Section 3(b) of the Evidence 
(Civil Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act of Singapore, assistance 
to foreign authorities may be allowed only if the High Court of 
Singapore is satisfied that the evidence will be “obtained for the 
purposes of civil proceedings which either have been instituted 
before the requesting court or whose institution before that court is 
204 For example, the 2013 Amendment Act defined the administrative monetary penalty 
for insider trading committed as part of the asset management as three months’ management 
fees. See Sadakazu Osaki, Regulatory Reform in the Wake of Insider Trading Incidents 
Related to Public Offerings of New Shares, NRI PAPERS No. 190, 6 (Nov. 1, 2013). 
205 See Persaud, supra note 4, at 79 (observing that the courts held such purpose did not 
constitute legitimate parallel investigations). 
206 See id. 
207 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ong Congqin Bobby & Another, [1998] 3 SLR(R) 19 
(Sing.). 
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contemplated.”208 Singaporean residents challenged the SEC’s request, 
claiming that U.S. civil proceedings instituted by the SEC would be 
characterized as criminal in nature.209 However, the court held that 
assistance could be provided because the civil penalties were penal in 
nature as the money collected would go to the Treasury, not injured 
persons, but injunctive relief would be civil in nature both under 
Singapore and U.S. laws.210 
Similarly, in Hong Kong, securities regulators can obtain and use 
self-incriminatory evidence on condition that they will not use such 
evidence in criminal proceedings.211 In early 2016, a Hong Kong 
investor filed with the Hong Kong High Court for a judicial 
review, alleging that the Hong Kong regulator unconstitutionally 
provided self-incriminatory evidence to the Japanese regulator for use 
in administrative proceedings.212 The Court, however, held that the 
Japanese proceedings are “non-criminal and non-penal in character and 
properly categorized as administrative or regulatory proceedings.”213  
2. Implication to International Double Jeopardy
Due to the international double jeopardy principle, imposition of not
only a criminal penalty but also a “quasi-criminal” administrative or 
civil monetary penalty in one country might prohibit the other country 
from imposing a penalty. In the United States, the Hudson decision 
largely resolved this issue by permitting multiple penalties.214  
Developing law in Europe, however, seems to be going in the 
opposite direction. A district court in Paris recently held that French 
authorities could not prosecute French companies whose parent 
companies had signed either a deferred prosecution agreement or a 
non-prosecution agreement with the DOJ, though these agreements 
are the result of out-of-court negotiations and not an acquittal or 
208 Evidence (Civil Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act of Singapore, 1979 § 3(b). 
(Act No. 18/1979) (Sing.). 
209 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ong Congqin Bobby & Another, [1998] 3 SLR(R) 19, 19 
(Sing.). 
210 Id. ¶¶ 9–16. 
211 See Securities and Futures Ordinance, (2002) Cap. 571, A609, § 186(6) (H.K.) 
(prohibiting the SFC from providing incriminating evidence for use in criminal proceedings 
outside Hong Kong).  
212 AA and EA v. Sec. & Futures Comm’n, [2019] 41 H.K.C. 246, 8–11 (C.F.I.) (May 
5, 2016) (deciding to commence the judicial review proceedings). 
213 Judgment, AA, EA, Securities and Futures Commission, and Secretary for Justice, 
HCAL 41/2016, at 185 (Feb. 11, 2019). 
214 Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 496 (1997) (holding that civil sanctions are 
not “criminal punishment” to trigger the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause). 
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conviction.215 In 2014, the European Court of Human Rights ruled 
that “administrative” penalties imposed by the Italian securities 
regulator precluded a criminal prosecution.216 These cases suggest 
that an administrative or a civil monetary penalty—or even a 
negotiated settlement—may prevent another regulator from pursuing 
enforcement.  
CONCLUSION: 
FROM REGULATORY GAPS AND OVERLAP TO 
REGULATORY COMPLEMENT 
Securities regulators need to consider various factors when 
combating cross-border market misconduct while also filling 
regulatory gaps and avoiding unnecessary regulatory overlaps. They 
should meet at the earliest possible stage of investigation to determine 
whether enforcement interests and sanctions are overlapping, 
complementing, or conflicting. Thus, I propose the following guideline 
provisions to be incorporated in the MMoU: 
If an authority initiates enforcement activity that may affect 
important interests of any other authority, the first authority will 
notify and discuss with the other authority as promptly as possible 
to decide the best course of action, taking into account whether:  
• Regulatory interests are diverging or conflicting;
• A joint investigation or separate investigations are warranted;
• One of the Authorities should take a leading role in the
investigation;
• Contemplated remedies could nullify the other Authority’s
investigation due to international double jeopardy or similar
concerns;
• There is any limitation to share information, including
whether a proceeding of the requesting Authority would
likely be considered as “quasi-criminal”;
• Contemplated sanctions are duplicate, complementary, or
contradictory;
215 See Frederick T. Davis, International Double Jeopardy: U.S. Prosecutions and the 
Developing Law in Europe, 31 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 57, 77–78 (2016) (describing the case). 
216 See id. at 73 (citing Grande Stevens v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014)). 
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• A global settlement is desirable, including whether the
relevant Authorities can share penalties and recoveries
equitably; and
• Authorities could take actions on different persons involved
or different conduct.
Regulatory gaps and overlaps relate to each other because if 
regulators assert extraterritorial application too broadly, it causes 
regulatory overlaps, and, possibly, jurisdictional conflict. On the other 
hand, if regulators assert extraterritorial application too narrowly, it 
makes it easier for opportunists to tailor transaction structures to avoid 
regulation, thereby causing regulatory gaps.217 When a regulatory gap 
or regulatory overlap occurs, interests of each regulator are not aligned. 
Their interests may either conflict, complement, or diverge from one 
another. Through coordination and cooperation, regulators can 
transform regulatory gaps and overlaps into regulatory “complements” 
where regulators assist each other to fill gaps and reduce inefficient 
overlaps.  
217 Beyea, supra note 10, at 156. 
